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AN ESSAY ON THE PIANO, LAW, AND THE
SEARCH FOR WOMEN'S DESIRE
Jyulia & fanigsbergt
Pleasure in the female is not a requirement.
Margaret Atwood'
Does my sexiness upset you?
Does it come as a surprise
That I dance like I've got diamonds
At the meeting of my thighs?
Maya Angelou2
INTRODUCTION
The thesis of this essay is a simple one: to have a measure of
control over her destiny, to have any choices, a woman must be a
sexual agent, a subject of desire rather than an object. How can women
exercise any autonomy in any other realms if in their most intimate
lives they are unable to voice their desires? I do not mean to suggest
* Julia E. Hanigsberg (B.C.L. 1991, LL.B. 1991, McGill University Faculty of Law,
LL.M. 1995, Columbia University School of Law) is an Associate in Law at Colum-
bia University School of Law.
t Earlier versions of this essay were presented at a Feminism and Legal Theory
Workshop entitled Direction and Distortion: The Centrality of Sexuality in the
Shaping of Feminist Legal Theory, Columbia University School of Law, June 6-8,
1994, and the Law & Society Annual Meeting, June 1994. I wish to thank Drucilla
Cornell, Martha A. Fineman, Isabel Karpin, Nancy Barta-Smith, Lorne Sossin, and
Patricia J. Williams for their invaluable comments. I would also like to thank the
participants at the Feminism and Legal Theory Workshop for their thought-provok-
ing questions and comments. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the insights of a
number of participants in on-line discussion groups who shared their opinions of
The Piano with me. This research could not have been completed without the
financial support of the Columbia University School of Law, the Canada-U.S.
Fulbright Program, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada. This essay was written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of the Science of Law in the School of Law, Columbia University.
1. Margaret Atwood, The Female Body, in MINDING THE BODY: WOMEN WITERs ON
BODY AND SouL 89, 92 (Patricia Foster ed., 1994).
2. MAYA ANGELOU, Still I Rise, in JusT Griv ME A COOL DRINK OF WATER 'FOa I
Drim 154, 155 (1966).
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that sexuality has unlimited explanatory power or that everything about
women's domination can be explained by a rearticulation of desire. I do
believe, however, that although the issue of sexuality is much discussed,
feminist legal theorists have been saying "too much about too little."'
In this essay I propose that we cannot even know the explanatory
power of sexuality as long as women do not have the words to express
their own desires.
One reason legal theorists must closely examine desire is that sex is
a location of danger for women in this culture. This is not to say that
sex is always violence, but that sexual violence (and its pervasive threat)
is an everyday fact for women. In addition, sex that occurs under
circumstances of problematic consent remains a source of conflict or
concern in most women's lives, particularly in the lives of young wom-
en.4 Furthermore, regardless of the experiences of particular women,
popular culture defines and confirms certain representations of women
by uniting images of sex and violence.5 The media have become pas-
sionate about these issues, both eroticizing and depoliticizing them.6 In
this essay I will discuss director Jane Campion's film The Piano, analyz-
ing how the authoritative parameters of desire are reproduced in a
cultural form through relationships both within and outside "the law."
Thinking about women's desire leads inexorably to issues of iden-
tity, issues whose complexity transcends the category "women." In dis-
cussing women's desire we cannot avoid the question of which women's
desire we are considering. Although I do not intend these questions to
3. Tracy E. Higgins, Reconsidering Sexuality in Feminist Theory. "What Do Women
Want?" and 'Why Should Feminists Care?" 1 (June 1994) (unpublished paper
delivered at Direction and Distortion: The Centrality of Sexuality in the Shaping of
Feminist Legal Theory, Columbia University School of Law, June 6-8, 1994, on file
with author). For a helpful discussion of the concept of agency in feminist legal
theory, which engages questions about women's sexuality and desire, see Kathryn
Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLuM.
L. REV. 304 (1995).
4. It is also a source of conflict in the lives of (young) men. There is an emerging
body of research on the issue of masculine sexuality and its impact on social theory.
E.g., VicrOR J. SEIDLER, UNREASONABLE MEN: MASCULINrrY AND SocIAL THEORY
(1994). In addition, I want to note at the outset that in confining this essay to
some fairly narrow thoughts about women's desire I do not posit women as victims,
nor men as victimizers.
5. For example, representations of sex and violence are regularly used in mainstream
advertising. See ELLEN McCRAcKEN, DECODING WOMEN'S MAGAZINES: FROM
MADEMOISELLE TO MS. 116-17 (1993).
6. For a discussion of how news reporting eroticizes and depoliticizes sexual crimes, see
HELEN BENEDICT, VIRGIN OR VAMP: How THE PRESS CoVERs SEx CRIMES (1992).
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be the subject of this essay, the use of the category "women" suggests a
slippage into false universals and a potentially misleading, implicit "we."
We must acknowledge that within-eveiry coalition and affinity there will
be tension and disunity.7 Nonetheless, there are unities, and still ways
and reasons to discuss "women" without flattening the multiplicity of
subjectivities represented by individual women. In short, although I
take seriously the reality that feminist theory has persistently homoge-
nized women's experience, I still think that it is both useful and possi-
ble to talk about "women's" bodies and "women's" desires without
marginalizing women whose shifting positions in the matrix of class,
race, and erotic preference are different from my own.8 Indeed, it is
particularly necessary to acknowledge women's diversity in legal settings,
where there is constant pressure to choose a story.9 Such settings are, to
put it mildly, resistant to narratives of fluid subjectivity" or intersec-
tions of oppression.
11
7. See K=THY E. FERGUSON, THE MAN QUESTION: VISIONS OF SUBJECTIVrrY IN FEMI-
NIST THEORY 160 (1993) (explaining how dass, race, gender, and erotic choice--all
differences within identity claims--exemplify potential disunity within a group).
8. My thinking about these issues has been especially influenced by the following texts:
AUDRE LoRDE, SISTER OUTSIDER (1984); Maria Lugones, Playfulness, "World"
Traveling and Loving Perception, 2 HYPATiA 3 (1987), reprinted in WOMEN, KNOWL-
EDGE, AND REA= (Ann Garry & Marilyn Pearsall eds., 1989); EUZABETH V.
SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT
(1988); Teresa de Lauretis, Upping the Anti (sic) in Feminist Theory, in CONFUCTS
IN FEMINIsM 255 (Marianne Hirsh & Evelyn Fox Keller eds., 1990); Mary Childers
& bell hooks, A Conversation about Race and Class, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM,
supra, at 60; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, in
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 235, 254-55 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy
eds., 1991); GAYATRI C. SPIVAX, In a Word- Interview, in OUTSIDE IN THE TEACH-
ING MACHINE 1 (1993); FERGUSON, supra note 7; SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL
THINKING: TOWARD A POLITCS oF PEACE 51-57 (1989).
9. See Marie Ashe, ZigZag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction"
and the Law, 13 NovA L. REv. 355 (1989) ("Committed to categorization, law is
intolerant of porous boundaries (placentas?).").
10. For a consideration of mobile and pluralistic subjectivity, see FERGUSON, supra note
7, at 160.
11. Kimberld Crenshaw is perhaps the best known theorist to discuss the notion of
"intersectionality," that is, the notion that multiple oppression constitutes something
greater than the sum of its parts. In particular, Crenshaw addresses the way that
Black women face two-pronged oppression, by virtue of their race and their gender,
and how this multiple oppression poses problems for mainstream constitutional
discourse. See Kimberld Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:
A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and
Antiracist Politics, in FEMINIST LEcuG. THEORY, supra note 8, at 57.
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Using The Piano as a metaphor, I will consider how legitimated
voices of desire for women might change the way that some legal issues
of special importance to women are framed. Although these observa-
tions are preliminary, I hope to show how giving voice to women's
desires may provide some tools to allow legal theorists to re-examine the
way in which issues such as procreative decision making, custody, and
rape (to name but three examples) are envisioned.
I. THE PIANO AND SILENCE AS SUBVERSION
The Piano is an interesting metaphor for unspoken feminine desire.
Campion's film offers the hypothesis of silence as subversion in the
context of a number of relationships, both "legal" and "outside the
law." These include a series of bargains and contractual relationships. In
the film, Campion takes the Lacanian symbolic" and turns it on its
head, metaphorically stating, "if language is the entry into the symbolic,
well, you can take your symbolic, I won't play."
This very popular, controversial, and critically acclaimed movie has
been the subject of widespread discussion among feminists for its con-
flicting messages and images, while it has been portrayed by the mass
media as a women's or feminist film. 3 It is not necessary or perhaps
12. French psychoanalytic theorist Jacques Lacan reads Sigmund Freud's theory of psy-
chic development as divided into three essential orders: the Real, the Imaginary, and
the Symbolic. The Symbolic is the order of language, representation, and culture,
the order in which meaning is transformed into discursive form and in which law is
to be found. See, e.g., JAcQuEs LAcAN, The Function and Field of Speech and Lan-
guage in Psychoanalysis, in .carrs: A SELECTON 30 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977). See
also J. LAPLANCHE & J.-B. PoNTALIs, THE LANGUAGE OF PSYCHo-ANALYsIs 439-40
(Donald Nicholson-Smith trans., 1973); DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND AccOMMO-
DATION: ETHICAL FEMINIsM, DECONSTRUCTION, AND THE LAw 36 (1991).
13. See, e.g., Jay Carr, "The Piano" Strikes a Lasting Chord, BOsTON GLOBE, Nov. 19,
1993, at 93; Creation Myths, SUNDAY TImEs, Dec. 5, 1993 (Features), at 5; Bob
Fenster, Uptight Piano Strikes Chord But Can't Hold It, Amiz. REPUBLIc, Nov. 19,
1993, at E9; Veronica Groocock, Women and Film: A Sight and Sound Reader (book
reviews), NEw STATESMAN & SocETr, Jan. 7, 1994, at 38; Stuart Klawans, The
Piano, NATON, Dec. 6, 1993, at 704; Craig Macnnis, The Piano: A Finely Tuned
Masterpiece, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 19, 1993, at B1; Susan Schwartz, The Power of
Language Is Beyond Words, GAZETrE (Montreal), Dec. 19, 1993, at C2; Holly
Sorensen & John Housely, Reeling in the Years: A Salute to Some of Filmmakings'
Pioneer Women (Special Issue: Women in Hollywood), PREMIERE, Sept. 15, 1993, at
52; Ruthe Stein, An Eye on Reality: Women Directors Bring a Diffirent Sensibility to
Their Movies, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 20, 1994 (Sunday Datebook), at 20; Kristi
Tumquist, A Body of Evidence: Hollywood Needs Sex-Ed Lessons, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Jan. 9, 1994 (Show Section), at 3.
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even interesting to debate whether The Piano ought to be categorized as
"feminist." The film does, however, offer a startling illustration of the
absence of a language of feminine desire and the possibility of resis-
tance, suggesting some difficulties with disengagement as a strategy for
the subversion of patriarchy. At the same time, it offers problematic
imagery and suggests a reification of racial and gendered stereotypes
that should not go unexamined. In addition, the film provides a meta-
phorical backdrop for this essay's consideration of the need for femi-
nine/feminist voices to speak the desires of women.
The film's protagonist, Ada, is a mute young Scotswoman who is
shipped by her father to New Zealand in the 1850s to marry Stewart, a
Scottish settler whom she has never met. She brings the two things that
mean the most to her: her daughter, Flora, and her piano. We know
little about Flora's father, but we do know that Ada was never before
married. We hear about the father twice. First, through a fantasy that
Flora recounts to Stewart's sister, in which she talks of her mother's
marriage in a forest with fairies as bridesmaids. Later, Flora, as though
it were an oft-recounted bedtime story, asks Ada to tell her about her
father and why Ada and he had never married. Ada's only explanation
was that he became frightened and that after Flora was born he was
sent away. The relationship between Ada and her daughter's father is
thus outside of "law" and Flora is the lasting legacy of that outlaw
desire.41
Upon their arrival in New Zealand, Ada and Flora are deposited
on the beach to wait for Stewart, who arrives the next morning. Stewart
14. On the notion of the "outlaw," see Debra D. Burrington, Constructing the Outlaw,
Outing the Law, and Throwing Out the Law, 1994 UTAH L. Rav. 255, 256:
An outlaw becomes an outlaw by existing outside of the law. While this
appears to be a somewhat circular argument, it merely asserts that there is
no "natural" outlaw who exists prior to the creation of law by a society.
That is to say, a body of laws must exist before anyone can be said to be
either law abiding and inside the law, or law breaking and therefore an
outlaw.
The notion of "outlaw culture" has been important for African-American resistance
narratives. See, e.g., Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a
Politics ofIdentification, 65 S. C_. L. Ray. 1769 (1992); Monica J. Evans, Stealing
Away: Black Women, Outlaw Culture, and the Rhetoric of Rights, 28 HAv. C.R.-
C.L. L Rav. 263 (1993); Theresa A. Martinez, Embracing the Outlaws: Deviance at
.the Intersection of Race, Class, and Gender, 1994 UTAH L. Rav. 193. See also
HowARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SocIoLoGY oF DEVIANCE 8-14
(1963).
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is accompanied by a group of Maori natives and another European
settler, Baines, an illiterate man who bears Maori tattoos on his face.
Stewart refuses to transport the piano from the beach through the
muddy jungle to his farm, ostensibly because it is too cumbersome.
Once settled at the farm, Ada takes advantage of Stewart's absence to
find Baines and ask him if he will lead her back to the beach to retrieve
the piano. When she is reunited with her instrument, Ada plays while
Baines listens and Flora turns cartwheels on the beach.
After Stewart returns, Baines offers to trade him land for piano
lessons as well as the piano itself. When Ada hears of the deal the two
men have struck, she is furious, but Stewart commands her to give
Baines the lessons. For Stewart, the deal is strictly a matter of com-
merce; for Baines, however, the contract is motivated by sexual desire.
Ada soon learns that Baines does not want to learn to play the
instrument but prefers to watch her play. The two negotiate their own
bargain, whereby she will play and allow him to watch, touch, and
gradually unclothe her in exchange for piano keys, allowing her to "buy
back" the piano. He wants one lesson for each white key, she haggles,
offering one lesson for each black key; and they agree: a bargain is
struck, a contract made.
Ada is mute but not deaf. She communicates either through sign
language, which Flora is able to translate, or by writing on a pad she
keeps arouind her neck. Her muteness is characterized as a choice; the
film opens with the voice-over of the six-year-old Ada, telling us, "I
have not spoken since I was six years old. No one knows why, not even
me. My father says it is a dark talent and the day I take it into my
head to stop breathing will be my last."' 5
But Ada is not truly silent, for she communicates through her
piano. Her music is a rush of expressiveness that is unbounded by and,
therefore, threatening to the language of civilization-the language that
structures the very bargains between her father and her husband and
between her husband and Baines, bargains of which she is the literal
object. By refusing to speak she abandons the language of patriarchy
and instead is able to express herself in a fashion unmediated by the
symbolic.' 6 With her piano she transcends the limits of a language for
15. JANE CAMPION, THE PIANo 9 (1993). This is the screenplay to the movie. Recently,
a novelization has been published as well: JANE CAMPION & KATE PULLINGER, THu
PIANO: A NOVEL (1994) [references in subsequent foomotes are to the screenplay].
16. Of course I mean this metaphorically. She has not in fact given up language since
she continues to write and sign. Nor is music itself necessarily a subversive form of
expression.
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and of men. Instead, she "speaks" with her body through the piano.
Her silence is neither passive nor uncomplaining, thus shattering two
feminine ideals of patriarchal culture. Her silence is, rather, the expres-
sion of active resistance. In her silence Ada protests the stifling of the
female voice by reappropriating voicelessness. In this way, Ada fails to
fulfill the social expectation of her sexuality as passive. Her desire voices
itself passionately through her music.
Much like the Victorian "hysteric,"17 Ada speaks the mute language
of protest. Is it possible to see a liberating motive in her refusal to
speak?'" To express herself verbally would be to capitulate to the lan-
guage of the patriarchal contract, converting her, paradoxically, into
Stewart's uncomplaining wife. Instead, by speaking through music, Ada
steps out of the law of the patriarch, out of "civilization," to a place
where woman's desire can be "spoken," if not necessarily heard. Like
other "hysterics," Ada refuses to cooperate dutifully with patriarchal
conventions. By playing her instrument, Ada conveys meaning non-
linguistically, exploding discursive conventions and failing to conduct
herself in the manner expected of her.
Campion's use of language in The Piano is reminiscent of Lacan's
prioritization of language and the symbolic as a superior mode of
communication. According to Lacan, the phallus is the transcendental
signifier and the only point of access into the symbolic, which is the
domain of language and the law of the father.' 9 Woman is thus always
Other to language, without access to the symbolic, frozen out, but
frozen out from what? A phallocentric discourse in which she is only
Other and Lack, a discourse that she has had no part in constructing?
According to this analysis, woman can have no language of her own in
which to express desire. She must become fluent in the language of
17. Hysteria, a disease thought primarily to affect women, was dinically described in
the second half of the nineteenth century, although its origins are ancient. A species
of neurosis, its main characteristic is a set of physical symptoms, such as loss of
voice or paralysis, with no known physical or medical explanation. See Claire
Kahane, Hysteria, Feminism, and the Case of The Bostonians, in FEMINISM AND
PSYCHOANALYSIS 280, 280 (Richard Feldstein & Judith Roof eds., 1989); J.
LAPLANcHE & J.-B. PoNrAns, THE LANGUAGE OF PsYcHoANALYsIs 194 (Donald
Nicholson-Smith trans., 1973). See also SIGMUND FREUD, DORA: AN ANALYSIS OF A
CASE OF HYsTUA (Philip Rieff ed., 1963).
18. Dianne Hunter, Hysteria, Psychoanalysis and Feminism: The Case ofAnna 0., in THE
(M)oTHER TONGUE 89, 92 (Shirley Garner et al. eds., 1985).
19. See generally LAcAN, supra note 12, esp. ch. 1, The Mirror Stage as Formative of the
Function of the L
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male desire, because she has no other choice. Not her "mother" tongue,
this "other" tongue is the only language available to her.
I do not mean to suggest that Ada's encounter with an alternative
discourse of desire is a simple utopia in which patriarchy is surmounted
at the piano keyboard. The desire that Ada expresses, initially through
her piano and subsequently in Baines' bed, is troubling. Their relation-
ship has its genesis in their bargain, a bargain negotiated from positions
of power that were vastly unequal. In this way, the film challenges us to
question whether a woman can sell her body and still maintain any
integrity. If we conclude that she cannot, we must then ask whether the
entire story is merely an eroticization of either rape or prostitution or
both.
Like a prostitute, Ada haggles. She negotiates the price of what she
wants, the piano, with the man who has it. Ada is never passive, never
a mere object of men's desires. She continues to negotiate even after
acquiescing to the disturbing bargain. She remains resistant and de-
mands a higher "price" as Baines demands increasingly more from her
(that she take off her clothing, etc.).
But the gaze provided by Campion's camera suggests that what is
being depicted may be more subtle than prostitution, foreshadowing the
evolution of the relationship. This gaze is surprisingly egalitarian. It
views Baines undressed, caressing the piano that is mute without Ada
there to play it. It shows him in full frontal nudity, open to the viewer,
before a fully clothed Ada-a rare role-reversal for contemporary
cinema. Campion seems to suggest that in this relationship Baines is
vulnerable as well. Indeed, it is Baines who eventually abandons the
bargain. Because he wants to liberate Ada, he is unable to sustain it. He
acknowledges the wrong that is the bargain: his conscience keeps him
from continuing to fondle an unwilling Ada. He becomes so sick with
what he has done that he literally takes to his bed. Only once the
bargain is broken does the beginning of mutual desire finally find its
place in the relationship between Ada and Baines. Following the rup-
ture of the bargain, they arguably interact as equals: the striptease that
was the heart of his half of the bargain is no longer played out-they
undress together.2" As long as Baines' desire for Ada was within the
"law," bound up in contract, it could not be reciprocal; he remained
20. Stella Bruzzi, Jane Campion: Costume Drama and Reclaiming Women's Past, in
WOMEN AND FILM: A SIGr AND SOUND R.AR 232, 241 (Pam Cook & Philip
Dodd eds., 1993).
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the representative of white, hierarchical patriarchy, tattoos notwithstand-
ing. Only by abandoning the bargain and not seeking another-not
trying to determine their relationship through law-is their desire made
mutual. Ada demonstrates her abiding desire for that which is outside
the confines of law by rejecting what has been chosen for her as a
lawful focus of desire, that is, her husband.
In contrast to Ada's relationship with Baines, Ada and Stewart
never relate as equals. Instead, with Stewart, the quintessential patriar-
chal relationship is played out. Ada's connection with him is within
"the law." It is arranged by her father and accorded legal status as
marriage: the product of two contracts. Stewart relates to Ada through
authority, attempting to bend her will to conform to his wishes. The
only way he can interact with her is to cage her: first literally, in the
house, which he meticulously boards up when he discovers the true
nature of the piano lessons; and later, in an attempted rape in the
woods when, ironically, she is saved by the constraining nature of her
Victorian clothing.
2 1
The relationships between the characters in The Piano reflect a
psychoanalytic discourse that has its origins in the work of Sigmund
Freud and Jacques Lacan and that has been adopted and subverted by
feminist literary theorists. From the Freudian/Lacanian perspective, at
its most basic, women's desire is the un-seen. There is simply no place
for women's desire-it is the desire that isn't. Woman is theorized as
Lack, her desire marked by absence.22 What is dramatically obvious in
the boy is markedly invisible in the girl. While the little boy fears
castration, having observed what his father possesses and his mother has
(in his imagination) "lost," the little girl experiences her castration as a
fait accompli, the loss that has taken place. 23 The little girl's desire thus
turns to the father in the hope of getting what he "has," and what her
mother, to the little girl's growing disappointment and resentment,
21. Bruzzi, supra note 20, at 238. Bruzzi points out that this clothing plays an impor-
tant role in the film. Earlier it also protected both Ada and Flora when the hoop
skirts provided shelter on the beach upon their arrival in New Zealand. Bruzzi,
supra note 20, at 238.
22. For a lucid description of how women are theorized as Lack, see Ellie Ragland-
Sullivan, Seeking the Third Term. Desire, the Phallus, and the Materiality of Language,
in FEmimsM AND PsvcHoAxA.Ysis 40, 41-42 (Richard Feldstein & Judith Roof
eds., 1989).
23. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, Female Sexuality (1931), in Saxupar AND THE Psy-
CHOLOGY or Lov 194, 198 (Philip Reiff ed., 1963).
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lacks.24 Of course the power represented by the phallus, this mark of
desire, is a fantasy, one as elusive to the boy as to the girl: the little boy
only has a penis-a mere piece of flesh-not the phallus, the emblem
of power.2 5 The phallus signifies desire but cannot be "had," only
longed for. Thus, within this phallocentric order, woman is without
desire, without essence, only Lack, always object to the male subject.
Her desire is confined to what she does not have and is constituted by
envy. The "mature" way for women to confront this envy, the key to
femininity according to Freud, is to identify with the father, then to
turn to the male object of desire (the husband), and finally to fulfill the
desire for the penis by having a child (a boy child being the most
compelling penis substitute for obvious reasons).
26
In Freudian/Lacanian terms, Stewart quickly assumes the phallic
role of the potent "other" in Flora's life. She turns to him, simulta-
neously abjecting her mother. The vision of the mother/daughter rela-
tionship that Campion provides is superficial, ultimately pessimistic,
and, perhaps not coincidentally, deeply Freudian. Particularly disturbing
to the feminist viewer of the film is the fact that the mother/daughter
relationship that is so intimate and intense initially is subsequently
disrupted by Ada's relationship with Baines. At one point Ada literally
shuts out her daughter while giving Baines his piano lesson, leaving
Flora outside on the porch asking to be let in. Later, Flora looks
through the cracks in the wall of Baines' house, seeing parts of the
naked bodies of her mother and Baines intertwined. In the next scene
she plays with a group of Maori children, hugging, kissing, and rubbing
themselves up against trees in the forest. Stewart sees this, grabs Flora
and tells her never to do it again, suppressing both her emerging sexual-
ity and her equally threatening association with the Maori children. He
tells her that she has been "shamed" and has "shamed" the tree trunks,
instructing her to wash them off.
Flora and Ada become adversaries of a sort. Flora is shut out by
her mother's desire for Baines, the moral being that a woman must
choose between intimacy with her child and sexual expression.27 Yet
24. FREUD, supra note 23, at 202.
25. See Ragland-Sullivan, supra note 22, at 42-43.
26. FREUD, supra note 23, at 181, 198-99.
27. For discussions of incompatibility of motherhood and sexuality, see, e.g., IRIs
MARION YOUNG, Breasted Ecperience, in THROWING LKE A GiRL AND OTHER
EssAYs IN FEMINIsT PHILOSOPHY AND SocuLA. THEORY 190, 196-200 (1990); Carol
Sanger, Seasoned to the Use, 87 MIcH. L REv. 1338, 1356-65 (1989).
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when Flora attempts to identify with the desire expressed by her
mother, when she is moved by the sight of her mother's sexuality to an
expression of her own desire by engaging in an autoerotic yet commu-
nal expression with the Maori, she is punished. She is identified as
"shamed" and simultaneously learns that her mother's behavior is
shamefil and not to be identified with. It is this experience that leads
to Flora's increasing spurning of Ada-a rejection in response to Ada's
earlier rejection of Flora in favor of Baines. This is a deeply troubling
set of events that seems to reify the Freudian assumption that the
mother's sexuality is expressed only through her child. For Ada to
express her desire otherwise requires that she reject her daughter.2"
Having a child and expressing desire are antithetical in the world of this
film.
Ada insists on continuing to see Baines, and Stewart's violence
escalates far beyond his unsuccessful attempt to cage her: he ultimately
resorts to brutal mutilation, metaphorically clipping her wing. Flora
plays out her part in this Oedipal drama29 in almost classical form. She
28. It is significant that while the piano itself functions as the voice of Ada's desire, her
daughter Flora is most often the one who speaks for Ada to the world, including to
Stewart, who represents the world of fathers. At the same time, Flora is a clear
reminder that desire can exist outside the bounds of the law (having been conceived
outside the legal institution of marriage). Although some viewers might consider
Ada's encounters with Baines to be her sexual awakening, Flora reminds us that Ada
has subverted the patriarchal structure that tried to control her desire at least once
before.
29. In classical Greek mythology, Oedipus is the unknown son of Laius and Jocasta.
Laius is told by the Delphic oracle that he will be given a son but that he is des-
tined to die at that son's hand. Laius attempts to cheat fate upon the birth of his
son by ordering a servant to let the infant die of exposure on Mt. Cithaeron.
Taking pity on the baby, the servant instead gives him to a shepherd, who later
gives the infant to his master, Polybus, the king of Corinth. The child is brought
up by the king and queen of Corinth and is named Oedipus. Years later, a drunk
accuses Oedipus of not being Polybus' natural son. Oedipus goes to the oracle at
Delphi to find out the truth. The oracle warns him to avoid his homeland since he
is destined to murder his father and marry his mother. Determined to follow the
oracle's warning, Oedipus does not return to Corinth and instead goes towards
Thebes. On his journey Oedipus is driven off the road by another chariot carrying
two men. Angered, Oedipus hits the driver. In the fight that ensues Oedipus kills
both driver and passenger. The passenger turns out to be his biological father
Laius-the curse is half fulfilled. When Oedipus reaches Thebes he finds the city in
distress. Not only is its king dead, but the city is being held captive by the monster
Sphinx. The monster has asked a riddle and has threatened to kill all those who
cannot solve it. Jocasta's brother, the regent, offers the throne and his sister's hand
to any man who can answer the riddle and rid the city of the Sphinx. Oedipus
solves the riddle and is wed to his mother, thus completing the fulfillment of the
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betrays her mother, taking the message that Ada intends for Baines and
giving it to Stewart instead. This leads to the pivotal moment of vio-
lence in the film: upon discovering Ada's defiance, Stewart drags her to
the chopping block, raises his axe, and savagely chops off her finger.
This same scene represents Campion's parody of the little boy's
Oedipal complex as well. For the little boy the salient emotion is not
envy but fear: fear of castration, of becoming what the girl already is
and what she represents for the boy. Whereas the little girl acts out of
envy, the little boy's sexuality is structured around avoidance of punish-
ment. Woman represents his own fear of Lack;3 it is this very fear that
is represented so violently in the scene in which Stewart severs Ada's
finger. Given that playing the piano expresses her voice of desire, he
effectively cuts out her tongue. This gesture is Stewart's attempt to
castrate Ada, but he is doomed to fail because, within the Freudian
paradigm, she is already castrated and thus has nothing to lose.31 At the
same time and with greater consequences for the narrative, the event
represents Stewart's own lack of phallus. For after this "castration,"
paradoxically, it is not Ada who is subdued but Stewart who is emascu-
lated. At this point Stewart stops even the pretense of a fight for Ada's
affection, abandoning a plan to shoot Baines. For her part, Ada remains
defiant.
curse. According to Sophodes' rendition of the myth, when the truth eventually
comes out Jocasta hangs herself and Oedipus blinds himself with the brooches from
her robe. See MARiK P.O. MoaRoRD & ROBERT J. LENAIWON, CLAssIcAL MYTHoLo-
GY 291-93 (2d ed., 1977). In Freudian analysis the Oedipus complex plays a
fundamental role in personality development and in the orientation of human
desire. See, e.g., FREUD, The Passing of the Oedipus Complex, in SEXuALITY AND THE
PsYcHoLOGy OF LovE, supra note 23; SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID
25-31 (James Strachey ed. & Joan Riviere trans., 1962). See also LkPLANCHE &
PoNT Us, supra note 12, at 282-87. For a critical rethinking of the Oedipus
complex see LucE IxiGARY, Psychoanalyc Theoy: Another Look, in THIs SEx
WHICH Is NOT ONE 34 (Catherine Porter trans., 1985). See also BuTLIE, infra note
30, at 95-111.
30. Judith Butler calls this "... the spectre of the recognition that it was always already
lost, the vanquishing of the fantasy that it might ever have been possessed-the loss of
nostalgia' referent." JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATrER: ON THE DIscuRsIvE
LUarrs OF "SEx" 101 (1993) (emphasis in original).
31. Indeed, what does the one who is always already punished have to fear? This ques-
tion disrupts both the Freudian construction of the Oedipal complex and Foucault's
assertion that sexuality is constructed through threat and punishment. See MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SExuAIr¢n 128 (Robert Hurley trans., 1990). See also
BUTLER, supra note 30, at 102.
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Throughout her sexual encounters, Ada is not the passive object of
desire. We know that she had a daughter outside of the patriarchal
family structure that she was born into and would have been expected
to sustain. She chooses to be unfaithful to her husband, risking what-
ever he might do to her. When she does decide to be intimate with
Stewart, it is on her terms, terms by which he cannot abide. In one
scene, she strokes Stewart's naked body but recoils when he tries to
touch her. In another, she fondles his back and he is unable to
continue. He is unable to respond to a communication of woman's
desire. An active feminine desire is outside of the discourse of "lawful"
sexuality that he inhabits. Frozen out of intimacy altogether by
patriarchy's construction of his own sexuality, Stewart is ultimately a
pathetic character despite his brutality.
The Piano offers a complex and troubling message. It is not a story
of Ada's liberation, nor is it simply a story of sexual violation. It is,
rather, a tale of choices within a realm of meager options. The film
opens up a world of desire in a place of resistance, which Ada fashions
by deciding not to speak, by choosing not to be the dutiful daughter
and wife, by refusing to give herself sexually to her husband, and by
choosing a lover who himself has stepped outside of what the film
structures as civilization.32 However, Ada is not able to articulate a new
32. Another troubling aspect of the film is its unproblematized use of racial stereotypes.
Baines represents the outsider. Living in the company of the Maori and affecting
their style of tattoo, Baines plays the person who has stepped back from civilization,
suggesting a move into a more "primitive" culture, closer to nature and to an
unconstructed desire. However, Campion's stereotypical perspective suggests an
evolutionary view of sexuality that posits non-Western or non-First World cultures
as an entry point to sexual freedom and, at the same time, presents the sexual
desires of non-European peoples as insatiable and comic. See JEFFREY Whzzs,
SaxuAxre 21, 39 (1986). Campion romanticizes the Maori people and their
domination by the colonists. Campion herself, however, daims that with respect to
the Maori she strived for authenticity, casting "real Maori" and relying upon their
advice. She explained that "[tbo start with, there was naturally enough a lot of
suspicion about the possible abuse of their culture.... You have to find the right
person to work with. But they're very open to debate and discussion, and you can
solve anything." Russell Smith, The Piano's Virtuoso, DALUAs MORNIMG Nnws, Nov.
20, 1993, at 5C. See also The Making of The Piano, in CAMPION, supra note 15, at
142-44. Even Baines' communion with the Maori poses the problem of appropria-
tion. However, the Baines character can be seen as caught between cultures, dissatis-
fied with the European culture he has rejected, but not a Maori despite his adop-
tion of certain outward symbols of their appearance. The cultural domination of the
Maori is not problematized by Campion: they are merely used as backdrop, as
desire uncivilized, somewhat like the wild, wet, jungle landscape that the movie
captures so vividly. See bell hooks, Sexism and Misogyny: Who Takes the Rap? Misogy-
ny, Gangsta Rap, and The Piano, Z MAGAziNE, Feb. 1994, at 26.
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"speech"; instead, she silences the babble of voices that represent her
objectification and exits out of language. Ultimately, this proves self-
defeating because there is no medium outside of language, no place of
signification where some natural or authentic identity lies.
At the end of the film, Ada and Flora leave New Zealand with
Baines to establish a new life together. In a confusing scene they are in
a canoe with the piano and several Maori who paddle the craft. Despite
Baines' objections, Ada insists that the piano be thrown overboard,
perhaps intending to leave silence behind. The piano is toppled over
the edge, and the loose ropes attached to it start to unravel and fall into
the sea. Ada slips her foot into the loop of the ropes and is dragged
forcefully into the water, pulled by the piano. She is drawn too deep to
be rescued by the Maori who dive in after her. She struggles, unable to
release herself, and then finally kicks her shoe off, freeing her foot. She
floats, suspended corpse-like in the water, then suddenly, as though just
awakening, she struggles up to the surface coughing and gasping for air.
She declares in a voice-over: "My will has chosen life!?" 3
But, seemingly, her will has chosen not only life but also to capitu-
late, to return to a newly constructed family unit, this time headed by
Baines. She also returns to "civilization"-to "law"-as represented in
the film by leaving the land for an urban setting. The film suggests that
the only place for Ada to go is another patriarchal structure, one in
which the finger taken by one man is replaced by another, because now
Baines has constructed a replacement finger for her out of metal. Even
her piano playing is no longer her own. Her music is now mediated
through patriarchy.34 as she plays we hear the tapping of the metal
finger on the piano keys. Is this finger, replacing the "castrated voice,"
a reappropriated phallus? Can a reappropriated phallus be emblematic
of women's desire or has Ada simply substituted one patriarchally
constructed desire for another?35
Most disturbing, perhaps, is that we see Ada learning to speak.
Can she find a voice within civilization (perhaps some voice of compro-
mise and necessity) or does speaking represent her capitulation to the
language and law of the father? The final scenes of the movie suggest
the latter. As she practices her speech she is unable even to show her
33. CAMPION, supra note 15, at 121.
34. This interpretation was suggested to me by Isabel Karpin.
35. Judith Butler explores the notion of a reappropriated phallus in The Lesbian Phallus
and the Morphological Imaginary, in BurLER, supra note 30, at 57.
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face. Veiled and shamed, her face covered by a dark cloth, she attempts
guttural sounds in the penultimate scene.
The return to the law, with its accompanying return to language,
should not come as a surprise. Desire is not something "out there"
beyond law. It is formed and structured in and against law. Law draws
the contours of sanctioned sexual conduct, proscribing the bad and,
only indirectly, prescribing the good." Any "lawless" desire was only a
fantasy that could not possibly be sustained. Indeed, it is difficult to
deal with the question of sexuality and the law where the law both
represses sexuality and is a prohibition that is generative of sexuality.3
Put another way, sexuality cannot be discussed without addressing law
because law both reacts to sexuality and is constitutive of it.
3
1
The final scene of the film, following the ambiguous image of Ada
returning to the world of speech under a self-imposed veil, is a dream
sequence in which Ada sees herself bound to her piano, floating deep
beneath the sea. Ada's voice-over says:
THERE IS A SILENCE WHERE HATH BEEN NO SOUND
THERE IS A SILENCE WHERE NO SOUND MAY BE
IN THE COLD GRAVE, UNDER THE DEEP DEEP SEA. 3
36. See FoucAum, supra note 31, at 36-49. See related discussion in Higgins, supra
note 3, at 12; Abrams, supra note 3, at 316.
37. FoucurT, supra note 31, at 47-48.
38. For example, building on a Foucaultian analysis, David Cole has argued that the
sexuality produced by social regulation of sexual expression is itself pornographic:
"[B]ecause our society has been so obsessed with controlling and regulating sexual
expression, we have elevated the aspects of transgression and taboo above all others."
David Cole, Playing by Pornograpys Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143
U. PA. L Ray. 111, 173 (1994). According to this logic, everything forbidden is
more tantalizing. See Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and
Scientific Method, 58 FoRDHAm L. REv. 263, 302 (1994). Along these lines, one
might argue that statutory rape laws make young women more desirable by con-
sttucting them as "forbidden fruit." CATHARINE A. MACKNNON, TOWARD A
FEmINST THEORY OF THE STATE 175-76 (1989). It may also be argued that the Su-
preme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding
sodomy legislation) played an active role in the solidification of sexual identities,
setting homosexuals further apart from heterosexuals and inaking them more
susceptible to vilification. See Kendall Thomas, The Edipse of Reason: A Rhetorical
Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1805, 1829 (1993); Jed Rubenfeld,
The Right of Privaq, 102 HARv. L REv. 737, 778-81 (1989).
39. CAMPioN, supra note 15, at 123 (quoting Thomas Hood's "Sonnet: Silence").
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Perhaps the eternal silence of a watery grave is the only option for truly
and uncompromisingly exiting from male-structured desire in the
paradigm of Ada's life. But suicide is not an appealing strategy, even
when the options are so limited.4"
The film suggests the paradox of silence as subversion. As Susan
Bordo has pointed out, the strategy of muteness as protest will always
involve ambiguity,4 because muteness remains the posture of the silent,
uncomplaining woman. In a sense silence is counterproductive and self-
defeating, leaving the woman unconnected in a fundamental way to the
outside world.42 If, as a strategy, silence is counterproductive, in law it
is impossible. To engage with law is to engage with the outside world.
To protest the lack of a voice for women's desires through law requires
some engagement with the very language which itself fails to leave room
for the articulation of that desire. But to engage with that silence
requires a confrontation of the symbolization of woman as Lack. With-
out subverting the abjected "mother/woman," we cannot break apart
the duality that is characteristic of the patriarchal order. To engage in
this subversive exercise requires an exploration of the insight that psy-
choanalytic perspectives can offer.
II. DESIRE UN-SEEN: BEYOND WOMAN AS LACK
Law, in its attempts to deal with human behavior, must be sensi-
tive to the origins and motivations of such behavior. The tools for deep
inquiry into human interaction and autonomy lie not in legal theorizing
in a vacuum, but rather in a kind of theorizing where the boundaries
between law and other disciplines are blurred. In particular, theoretical
perspectives that directly focus on the human subject and the subject of
desire, such as psychoanalytic theory, are helpful.43
40. Interestingly, when I gave an earlier version of this essay at a conference entitled
Direction and Distortion: The Centrality of Sexuality in the Shaping of Feminist Legal
Theory at Columbia University School of Law, June 6-8, 1994, a number of the
women in the audience commented that they thought the movie should have ended
at this point, with Ada dead, and that any other ending compromised the integrity
of the vision in the film.
41. SusAN BoRDo, UNBEARABLE WMGr. FEmINISM, WESTERN CULTURE, AND THE
BODY 176-77 (1993).
42. BoRDo, supra note 41, at 176-77.
43. Furthermore, psychoanalytic perspectives are impossible to avoid even for feminists
resistant to them, since they have become imbedded in our popular culture. Thus,
feminist legal theorists should reappropriate rather than ignore them. The symbol-
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This interdisciplinary approach first and foremost values psychoan-
alytic perspectives on sexuality for their power to explain the construc-
tion of sexual desire in late twentieth-century Western capitalist
societies. It also sees psychoanalysis as a heuristic model rather than a
fixed constellation of categories and terms. True, psychoanalysis has, in
certain incarnations, been used to force women into the object position
antithetical to autonomy and subjectivity. Nonetheless, this does not
minimize the need to know how that process has functioned and what
must be done to question current constructions of sexual desire and,
finally, to begin to envision new ones. As "classical" psychoanalytic
theories are considered, however, their reliance on ahistoricity and their
blindness to their own race, class, gender, and erotic biases must be
critically examined. Sexuality cannot be abstracted from social forces,
and the tendency of psychoanalytic theory to focus on the individual
rather than, for example, the construction of women's desire within the
political economy of Western capitalist societies, must be acknowledged.
This has been the particularly helpful work of feminist theory in the
psychoanalytic framework. 44 Thus, a re-imagination of women's desire
in psychoanalytic terms is necessary to rescue feminine sexuality from
the trap of psychoanalytic Lack and to allow law to express women's
desires.
Taking psychoanalytic perspectives into account does not entail a
naturalization of sexuality. It has become trite to observe that sexuality
is not something essential or ahistorical that is held in check by social
structures, but rather is a name given to an historical and social con-
struct that is itself linked to power and regulation. 45 In addition, I am
not positing sexuality as a unity, nor do I believe that there is an
"authentic" sexuality that merely needs to be uncovered. Even the
ization of psychoanalysis is pervasive in Western culture, and it affects all women.
This is particularly true because psychoanalytic perspectives are represented through-
out popular culture as well as through the discourse of "pop" psychology and the
self-help movement. Though I offer The Piano as an example of the permeation of
psychoanalytic perspectives of women's desire into popular culture, one does not
need to wait for "art" films. Many of the same messages about women's desire (and
their construction as Lack) are found in movies such as FatalAttraction, The Good
Mother, Dangerous Liaisons, The Hand that Rocks the Cradle, Basic Instinct and other
standard Hollywood fare.
44. See Elizabeth Abel, Race, Class and Psychoanalysis? Opening Questions, in CONFcrs
IN FEMINISM (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds., 1990); IIGAAY, supra
note 29, at 119, 125; E. Ann Kaplan, Is the Gaze Male?, in PowERs OF DEsIRE:
THa PoLrrzcs oF SaxuA=.rrY 309, 315 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983).
45. See FoucAuxrr, supra note 31, esp. at 105-106, 152.
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hegemonic vision of sexuality is itself composed of multiple voices,
including "moral treatises, laws, educational practices, psychological
theories, medical definitions, social rituals, pornographic or romantic
fictions, popular music, and commonsense assumptions," all of which
themselves are mutable over time and place."4 But within the stories of
sexual desire the multiplicity of women's voices exploring desire are
absent; these voices may entail a multitude of possible pleasures that
surely are not limited to heterosexual vaginal intercourse.
This absence of women's voices is perhaps not surprising. From
the classic psychoanalytic perspective, which has been dominant in
explorations of sexuality in the recent past, women's desire has been
posited as wound or Lack. Accordingly, women's sexuality is a "dark
continent," undiscovered and undiscoverable. From a feminist perspec-
tive, all sexuality is constructed in the context of male supremacy. If
desire is socially constructed, how are women's desires constituted given
that the matrices of power that mold their sexuality are male, heterosex-
ual, and in North America, largely white?
In acknowledging the construction of sexuality and the role therein
played by relations of power, it is necessary to clarify what power, and
whose hegemony, rather than to become caught up in endless indeter-
minacy outside of social context.4 7 In this analysis I am sympathetic to
Catharine MacKinnon's critique of post-structuralism and acknowledge
the patriarchal hegemony of desire that is her focus.48 I part company
with MacKinnon because I see no possibility for emancipatory change
in her theory of sexuality. Paradoxically, her theorizing is emblematic of
a male voice of desire. For MacKinnon, sexuality is pornography and
there is no way out under patriarchy: there is no option for sexual
encounters that are not violation; for men not turned on by force and
violence; for women who enjoy vaginal penetration and who are not
just like Pavlov's dogs salivating at the sound of the bell; or for women
who are genuinely hungry and not just conditioned to eroticize their
46. WExs, supra note 32, at 16.
47. Thus, it makes sense to consider whether it is law, the state, patriarchy, capitalism,
Western culture, or something else that is the locus of power. See, e.g., DIDI
HpmAN, RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: STRUGGLES FOR LESBIAN AND GAY LEGAL EQUALITY
9-10 (1994) (pointing out that the law and the state should not be conflated and
that treating the two as monolithic is simplistic); Sandra Morgen, Two Faces of the
State: Women, Social Contro and Empowerment, in UNCERTAIN TERMS: NEGOTIAT-
ING GENDER IN Awm mcA CuxustR 168 (Faye Ginsburg & Anna Lowenhaupt
Tsing eds., 1990) (seeing the state as a "primary arena of contestation").
48. MAcKmNoN, supra note 38, at 137, 141-42.
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own domination. 9 The crux of the implications of MacKinnon's vision
of sexuality is that force is sex, not sexualized; that sexuality is the
dynamic of control by which male dominance defines man, woman,
and sexual pleasure; and that sexuality is socially organized to require
sexual inequality.
50
Yet MacKinnon asks the interesting question that opens up the
otherwise closed system that is her paradigm: why, if the reality of
sexuality centers on male force and the eroticization of domination, do
not all women love pornography, and why do they resent rape? Why is
sexuality ever anything other than masochistic for women? She does not
answer these questions but instead describes women's sexual relations
with men as revolving inexorably around denial and fear.5 ' For example,
MacKinnon highlights what she perceives as the difficulty for women in
distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate forms of sexual inti-
macy: in her view, women are expected to distinguish what is "the
socially, epistemologically, indistinguishable. Rape and intercourse are
not authoritatively separated by any difference between the physical acts
or amount of force involved but only legally, by a standard that centers
on the man's interpretation of the encounter." 52 Here she conflates
what is indistinguishable to whom: the rapist may not know the
difference between sexual intercourse and rape, but women do. The law
may have a hard time distinguishing because of the lack of a legally
"authoritative" difference, but women do distinguish and do not need an
authoritative map. MacKinnon cannot claim that most women
experience their sex lives as a series of rapes; if her claim is that this is
what women experience whether or not they recognize it as such then her
position is universalizing and essentialist in the extreme.
I have made this excursus into MacKinnon's theory of sexuality to
demonstrate what I read as an example of the "penetration" of male
discourses of desire into feminist theory. By defining desire as always
already constructed through the gaze of domination and force, as, in
49. MAcKInNON, supra note 38, at 148 ("[D]oes anyone think Pavlov's dogs were really
hungry every time they salivated at the sound of the bell? If it is possible that
hunger is inferred from salivation, perhaps humans experience sexual arousal from
pornographic cues and, since sexuality is social, that is sexual arousal.") (footnote
omitted).
50. MAcKwNoN, supra note 38, at 136, 137, 140, 141, 243.
51. MAcKTN.oN, supra note 38, at 149-50. Again, paradoxically, in this way she is
both deeply Freudian and Foucaultian.
52. MAcKN NoN, supra note 38, at 150.
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essence, force eroticized (under patriarchy), MacKinnon adopts the
patriarchal structure of desire as hierarchy. In MacKinnon's vision
women's desires seem to have no place because there is no place outside
patriarchy-just as Ada could find no place outside the "law" in which
to sustain her desire. In the MacKinnon paradigm, any interpretation of
female sexuality is nothing but a valorization of powerlessness, oppres-
sion, and lack of choice. By setting up the dominance principle as
hegemonic, she reifies dominance, firmly telling us who is on top and
who is on the bottom-end of story."
Perhaps the story is not as pessimistic as that, although admittedly
it is easier to suggest questions than answers. Women's desires, as
unstable and diverse a category as that necessarily must be, are
articulable in ways that remain to be discovered. This articulation is an
experimental process involving a reappropriation of language. There is
no women's desire articulated by and about women within law.
Women are, however, beginning to play with the hegemonic language
of desire and are attempting to wrest it from its place of privilege. One
example is French feminist Luce Irigaray, whose metaphors construct
women's bodies as central to desire. 4 Irigaray focuses on (m)other
imagery, substituting the umbilical cord for the penis as a signifier of
desire.
5
Irigaray's use of imagery is disruptive because it rejects the lan-
guage of things seminal, penetrating, and potent, words that are used
without attention to their phallocentrism or to the emphatically male
metaphor. She instead finds meaning in the womb, the placenta, and
intra-uterine life. This imagery is all the more revolutionary because it
forces a confrontation with the maternal body; that is, Irigaray takes
what is constructed psychoanalytically as Lack and posits it as having
transcendental significance. Irigaray's language suggests that the mother
need not be abjected, that girls' sexuality does not have to be founded
on a repudiation of those "like" them and does not require turning to
the "potency" of the other "with" the phallus. 6 Irigaray suggests that
the placenta's fundamental role-as the "first house to surround
53. Or, in her now classic articulation: "Man fucks woman; Subject verb object."
MACKICNNON, supra note 38, at 124.
54. See, e.g., IviGAavY, supra note 29; LucE IRIGAmy, The Bodily Encounter with the
Mother, in THE IRIGAmAY READER 34 (Margaret Whitford ed. & David Macey
trans., 1991) [hereinafter ImGAAiY, The Bodily Encounter].
55. IhGARAY, The Bodily Encounter, supra note 54, at 39-40.
56. IiGARlAY, The Bodily Encounter, supra note 54, at 44.
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us"-may stay with us like a "halo" or "some child's security blanket"
and asks how this interpretation can be represented in culture.57 Fur-
thermore, she re-examines the Oedipal myth that so seduced Freud,
challenging the paramountcy of the phallus. 51 In her version of linguis-
tic feminism, the phallus may be rearticulated as something other than
a symbol of power and domination. In Irigaray's terms the phallus
could be a masculine version of another signifier-the umbilical cord.59
She suggests:
Where once was the cord, then the breast, there shall come in
its time, for man, the penis which binds, gives life to,
nourishes and recentres bodies, recalling in penetration, in
touching beyond the skin and the will, in the outpouring,
something of intra-uterine life, with detumescence evoking the
end, mourning, the ever-open wound. This would be a
preliminary gesture of repetition on man's part, a rebirth
allowing him to become a sexuate adult capable of eroticism
and reciprocity in the flesh.6"
I offer Irigaray neither as the answer to what "woman's desire" is,
nor to refute MacKinnon's pessimism; there is no generic woman's
desire and Irigaray cannot possibly speak for the multiplicity of
women's desires. But her insistence on what is known as "feminine
writing" is an interesting point from which to consider the possibility of
alternatives to patriarchal constructions of sexuality. Although Irigaray's
evocation of the maternal does not necessarily offer a way to exit
patriarchy, it does shift the gaze from domination.61 Rather than
repudiating woman's desire, she recognizes that the socially constructed
voice of desire is neither natural nor inevitable and is infrequently our
own.
57. IiciARv, The Bodily Encounter, supra note 54, at 39-40.
58. IamiAR., The Bodily Encounter, supra note 54, at 41.
59. Im ARY, The Bodily Encounter, supra note 54, at 42.
60. IaiGA Y, The Bodily Encounter, supra note 54, at 42. For another example of re-
imagining the feminine in sexual difference, see the conclusion to DRUCILLA COR-
NELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FamlNISM, DECONSTRUCTION, AND THE
LAw 197-205 (1991).
61. For an exploration of the complexities of the use of the maternal as a framework for
analyzing abortion, see Julia E. Hanigsberg, Homologizing Pregnancy and Mother-
hood- A Consideration ofAbortion, 94 MICH. L Ray. 371 (1995).
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III. LIVING DESIRE-WOMEN'S DESIRING LIVES
In the continuum of feminist theorizing, I ally myself with those
who posit the centrality of desire. We cannot fully discuss any legal
issues that most fundamentally concern women without considering
where desire fits. It is not sexuality per se, however, that interests me.
62
Rather, we must find the missing discourse of women's desires,63 which
has often been absent even as "sex" is incessantly discussed and obses-
sively dissected.
Legal scholars must be mindful of the importance of sex for wom-
en because sex is both produced by and produces the law. Law, with its
inherently conservative strain and repressive impulses, continues to
presuppose a dominant unified vision of sex." The nuances of identity
and the reality of mobile and multiple subjectivities are lost on a system
that emphasizes stability, regularity, enforceability, and predictability.
65
Thus, for example, rape laws are ill-prepared to contend with the
62. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 H, Rv. L. REV. 737, 744 (1989)
(discussing the predominant focus of constitutional privacy cases on sexuality, "the
network of decisions and conduct relating to the conditions under which sex is
permissible, the social institutions surrounding sexual relationships, and the procre-
ative consequences of sex").
63. See Tracy E. Higgins & Deborah L. Tolman, Law, Cultural Mediaftion], and the
Missing Discourse of Desire, in FEmrmsM, LAw, AND THE MEDIA (Martha A.
Fineman & Martha McCluskey eds., forthcoming 1996). See also Michelle Fine,
Sexualiy, Schooling and Adolescent Females: The Missing Discourse of Desire, 58
-Iuv. ED. REV. 29 (1988).
64. For example, heterosexuality is generally still treated as the norm and homosexuality
as the exception, or less neutrally, the deviant. This presupposition plays itself out
in many contexts. For example, the law of domestic abuse assumes that a woman is
battered by her male partner. Same-sex battery receives only a passing reference in
legal literature, and the tendency seems merely to assimilate it into existing struc-
tures. See Mary Eaton, Abuse by Any Other Name: Feminism, Difrence, and
Intralesbian Violence, in THE PUBLic NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 195, 199
(Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
65. It may seem that law actually is less reliant on stable categories than we might think
and that this is demonstrated by the way the law has evolved in its interpretation of
identity characteristics over time. Although it is true that over the course of time
the law does change in the way it apprehends identity characteristics, at any given
moment it presupposes stable categories. For law to be applied, categories that are
fixed and stable must be posited. For example, to define when and under what
conditions a person has suffered racial discrimination, the law must be able to see
concepts such as "race," "Black," or "African-American" as stable and relevant
categories. See also Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence,
Evidentiay Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123 (1992)
(discussing the construction and interpretations of facts in legal settings).
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complexity of a woman's sexual desire within a context of conflicting
needs and expectations. Particularly (but not exclusively) for a young
woman it is not unreasonable that a sexual encounter could be both
painful and pleasurable, consensual and coerced, liberating and
shaming. Such complexities are ill-understood and find little
opportunity for expression in a court of law. 6 Law views sexual desire
66. For example, in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Couny, 450 U.S. 464
(1980), the defendant challenged California's statutory rape provisions. In its deci-
sion, the Court failed to see the coercion and complexity involved in a sexual en-
counter between the eighteen-year-old defendant and the seventeen-year-old com-
plainant. Although Justice Blackmun described the complainant as a willing partici-
pant, the trial transcript demonstrates the intertwining of pleasure, power, and
desire, and, ultimately, pain and violence:
Q. What happened at the railroad tracks?
A. We were drinking at the railroad tracks and we walked over to this
bush and he started kissing me and stuff, and I was kissing him
back, too, at first. Then I was telling him to stop -
Q. Yes
A. - and I was telling him to slow down and stop. he said, "Okay,
okay." But then he just kept doing it. He just kept doing it and
then my sister and two other guys came over to where we were and
my sister said - told me to get up and come home. And then I
didn't
Q. Yes.
A. - andthen my sister and -
Q. All right.
A. -David, one of the boys that were there, started walking home and
we stayed there and then later-
Q. All right.
A. - Bruce left Michael, you know.
The Court: Michael being the defendant?
The Witness: Yeah. We was lying there and we were kissing each other,
and then he asked me if I wanted to walk him over to the park; so we
walked over to the park and we sat down on a bench and then he started
kissing me again and we were laying on the bench. And he told me to
take my pants off.
I said, "No," and I was trying to get up and he hit me back down
on the bench and then I just said to myself, "Forget it," and I let him
do what he wanted to do and he took my pants off and he was telling
me to put my legs around him and stuff-
Q. Did you have sexual intercourse with the defendant?
A. Yeah.
Q. He did put his penis into your vagina?
A. Yes.
Q. You said that he hit you?
A. Yeah.
Q. How did he hit you?
A. He slugged me in the face.
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through a remarkably unified lens of heterosexism, masculinity; and
power.
Thus, law is uncomprehending of women's desire. This is not
because the law is not mindful of desire, but because the desire
produced and constituted by the law is one-sided, simplified, and
overwhelmingly the construction of a privileged vantage point. This all-
consuming structure of desire in law elides any other conceptions so
completely that it seems almost illegitimate to suggest that law should
be concerned with desire at all.
In this way, sexuality has a central role in the shaping of feminist
legal theory. However, sexuality has most often been confronted only in
small doses and in limited places, frequently confined to discussions of
pornography.67 Opening up this discussion to reproductive choices
expands the boundaries of the discussion of women's desires and sug-
gests that there is seldom a moment of feminist theorizing when we
should not, in some way or another, be addressing issues of desire.
I started this essay by arguing that for women to have a measure of
control over their destiny, in order to exercise choice, women must
have the ability to act as sexual agents, that is, as subjects with-rather
than objects of-desire. Patriarchy, however, has structured women's
Q. With what did he slug you?
A. His fist.
Q. Where abouts in the face?
A. On my chin.




A. I had bruises.
The Court: Did he hit you one time or did he hit you more than once?
The Witness: He hit me about two or three times.
MichaelM., 450 U.S. at 484-85. See RuTH COLIER, ABORTION AND DLALOGU E 45
(1992) (discussing MichaelM. as "a poignant reminder of how little control adoles-
cent females often have of the conditions under which they engage in sexual activi-
ty"). See also Scheppele, supra note 65, at 42; Kim Lane Scheppele, Facing Facts in
Legal Interpretation, 30 REPSENTATIONS 42 (1990); Kim Lane Scheppele, Forward:
Telling Stories, 87 MIcH. L RLav. 2073 (1989).
67. See Carole S. Vance, More Danger, More Pleasure: A Decade after the Barnard
Sexualty Conference, in PLmuSRE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMAUa SEXUALITY xvi,
xxii-xxiii (Carole S. Vance ed., 1992) (describing how a wide-ranging conference on
women's sexuality devolved into a debate on pornography and censorship). See alo
Abrams, supra note 3, at 314-15 (noting that what she refers to as the "sex radicals'
analysis" has had an influence in the pornography debate but has had little influ-
ence on legal theory and doctrine more broadly).
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desires as passive and reactive: a woman's role is to control men's
rampant sexuality. This male sexuality is not merely oppressive because
it is hegemonic, it is dangerous. Exerting control is supposed to be the
answer to many of women's "problems," including rape and unwanted
pregnancy. But this is a solution that has been suggested by patriarchy,
that takes male desire and heterosexuality to be primordial, and perhaps
more fundamentally, this is a "solution" that does not work. A desire
that comes from the feminine need not be reactive; it will likely have
little to do with "consent" and may have much to do with motherhood,
contrary to the myths that see motherhood as antithetical to desire, or
that alternatively see motherhood as women's only possible outlet of
activity since they have no desire.
68
If women cannot speak their desires, then lawyers have a funda-
mental problem. Language is our tool. If we do not have the words to
say it then a court cannot hear it.6 9 Even when there are words, courts
frequently will not respond.7' To step outside of discourse offers us no
solution at all. The hysteric's silent subversion, while revolutionary in
68. See discussion of classical psychoanalytic theory supra notes 27-28 and accom-
panying text. See alo Jessica Benjamin, A Desire of One's Own: Psychoanalytic
Feminism and Intersubjective Space, in FEMlMST STUDIES/CRITICAL STUDIES 78,
83-84 (Teresa de Lauretis ed., 1986). With respect to the ideology of motherhood
more generally, see, e.g., MARTHA A. FNrEMaN, THE NEuTERED MOTHER, THE
SExuAL. FAMmY AND OTHER TwNmamTH CEmruRY TRAGEDIES (1995); Lisa C.
Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of Mother-
hooa the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53
OHIO ST. L.J. 1205 (1992); Dorothy Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning
of Motherhood, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 1 (1993); Carol Sanger, M Is for the
Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REv. L & WOMEN's STUD. 15 (1992).
69. Bruce A. Ackerman, Forward- Law in an Activist State, 92 YxUs L.J. 1083, 1084
(discussing "the birth of... a professionally stabilized rhetoric that increasing
numbers of lawyers will be obliged to master if they hope to translate their clients'
grievances into a language that power-holders will find persuasive"); Julia E.
Hanigsberg, Decoding Abortion Rhetoric, 37 McGiLu LJ. 928, 930 (1992) (book
review) (discussing how lawyers are faced with the difficulty of translating women's
private experience of abortion into something that can be heard and understood by
courts). See also Marie Ashe, The "Bad Mother" in Law and Literature: A Problem of
Representation, 43 HA=ST-GS L.J. 1017 (1992) (discussing the ability of lawyers to
represent clients whose stories they do not understand).
70. For example, in rape trials, fact-finders, while no longer requiring proof of utmost
resistance, may still require some evidence of physical resistance in order to substan-
tiate a rape victim's spoken "no." Merely having the word "no" in her arsenal is not
sufficient for the rape victim in the courtroom setting to prove lack of consent. See
Abrams, supra note 3, at 361-67; Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1124-32
(1986).
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some respects and a form of resistance to be sure, fails to address the
public nature of legal action. To find a place for women's desire we
must use words.71 Doing this will not be easy. Conceiving of women's
desires will involve listening to women, both to what they say about
desire and to what they do not say.72 It will involve constantly asking
the questions, "Who is speaking? And, who is silent?" 73 Any
rearticulation of desire must be responsive to women's actual experi-
ences. At the same time, this revision must be accepting of diversity and
multiplicity. White women, for example, may be surprised to find that
theories of desire and patriarchal control thereof that resonate with
them may not be compelling to African-American or non-First World
women.74 The law must be capable of acknowledging that there is no
single "authentic" women's desire and no utopia outside of society to
which women may turn to find their "true" desire.
75
71. As Regina Austin puts it in another context: "[There are times when low-volume
defiance must give way to all-out 'mouthing off.'" Regina Austin, Saffire Bound.,
1989 Wis. L. Rnv. 539, 576.
72. Higgins & Tolman, supra note 63.
73. Marie Ashe, Conversation and Abortion, 82 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 387, 400 (1988)
(reviewing MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW
(1987)).
74. See, e.g., Barbara Omolade, Hearts of Darkness, in PowaS oF DESIRE, supra note
44, at 350. For example, although rape law has been theorized as a vehicle for
controlling women's sexuality, for African-American women the rape story is almost
the inverse: the African-American woman has been symbolized as unrapeable (thus
a slave owner could not legally be conceived of as "raping" a slave) and at the same
time envisioned as the personification of desire, used by advertisers to embody the
"animal" instinct. BoRwo, supra note 41, at 10-11. See also Kimberld Crenshaw,
Whose Story Is It Anyway? Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of Anita Hill, in
RAcE-mG JUsTIcE, FN-GENDER/NG POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE
THOMAS, AND ThE CONSTRUCTION OF SocIAL REAuT 402 (Toni Morrison ed.,
1992); Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, "The Mind That Burns in Each Body': Women, Rape,
and Racial Violence, in PoWEas oF DEsIRE, supra note 44, at 328. The lynching of
African-American men in order to preserve white women's virtue is the other side
of this coin. Thus the view of women's sexuality as precious and deserving of
protection, which may appear to underlie some conceptions of rape law, and which
is disturbing because it is patriarchal and condescending, may be absent in the case
of non-white women.
75. Ellen Ross and Rayna Rapp use the compelling metaphor of the onion, drawing on
the imagery of Clifford Geertz: as we peel away each layer we may think that there
will be some notion of authenticity lurking in the center, but instead we find that
the whole is the essence. In that sense sexuality cannot be abstracted from those
layers that are the social influences that constitute it, including the influence of
patriarchy and the institutionalized oppression of women. Ellen Ross & Rayna '
Rapp, Sex and Society: A Research Note from Social History and Anthropology, in
POWERS Or DESIRE, supra note 44, at 51, 54.
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One purpose of this essay is to begin to consider the meaning of
desire in the sphere of procreativity and to draw attention to reproduc-
tive decision making in this context. How would the discovery of a
woman's voice of desire influence reproductive decision making? Given
that reproduction is mostly the result of vaginal sexual intercourse, it is
anomalous that reproductive decision making, including the decision to
abort and other decisions made by pregnant women, as well as the
state's impact on such decisions, is not analyzed as an issue to which
women's desire is relevant. One suggestion for reappropriating women's
desire from the realm of the pathological is to re-examine the desire in
the maternal.
As Irigaray's work has done in the context of psychoanalytic theory
and literary criticism, an alternative symbolization of women's desire in
law can offer particular insight into reproductive decision making.
Finding the unspoken desire may allow us to see women as decision-
making agents, rather than as objects of the decision making of men
(either the men in their lives or the patriarchal state). For example,
rather than seeing women on welfare who become pregnant as
irresponsible burdens on the state, or even as child abusers for bringing
children into "underprivileged" environments, it may be possible to see
pregnancy as connected to the expression of desire within a culture in
which women's corporeal selves are customarily perceived as having
only two purposes: as objects of men's desire or as means of
(re)production. Perhaps the rhetoric of reproductive choice is empty
without an investigation of the role played by desire. For example, a
woman's interest in motherhood might be considered worthy of legal
recognition and protection, regardless of her social status. Or
conversely, limiting a woman's access to abortion, despite her desire not
to carry a fetus to term, might be more readily recognized as
compulsory child-bearing, rather than a mere restriction on abortion.
Would a voice of women's desires make a difference in the way we
think about abortion and the rhetoric of responsibility?76 According to
76. For example, in the early anti-abortion campaign the incidence of abortion was
attributed to the "growing self-indulgence among American women." JAMEs MOHR,
ABORTION IN AMERICA 108 (1978). Women were likewise accused of seeking
abortions because of "the inconvenience incident to pregnancy, fear of the pains
and risk of labor, but mainly ... to avoid the labor and expense of rearing chil-
dren, and the interference with pleasurable pursuits, fashions, and frivolities."
ANDREW NEBINGER, CMmNAL ABORTION: ITS ExTENT AND PREVENTION 14 (1870),
reprinted in ABORTION iNINETBENTH-CNTURY AMERICA (1974). As another anti-
abortion activist put it, "Have you the right to choose an indolent, selfish life,
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conventional rhetoric, women who seek abortions have failed to control
the sexuality of the men they encounter and have failed to take respon-
sibility for their own sexuality. But what tools are women given for this
active "taking" of responsibility-how does an object express her
subjectivity? If women no longer bore the burden of controlling "male
vice," would responsibility stop being uniquely their burden?
By situating abortion and pregnancy in the realm of responsibility,
they are dislocated from heterosexuality. Along this paradigm, sexual
desire for men bears no burdens. "Nature" allows men the "freedom" to
express their sexuality unbounded by responsibility for pregnancy.
However, heterosexuality for women, even when not procreative in
intent, risks motherhood. Patriarchy has insured that "fatherhood" is
not necessarily a risk of male sexuality. This brings to mind Joan Nes-
tle's telling of her mother's girlhood rape.7 The thirteen-year-old girl is
attracted to a good-looking man in his twenties; she wants him and has
sex with him. She is later gang-raped by three of his friends and be-.
comes pregnant. Her father threatens to kill her if she aborts the preg-
nancy that resulted from either her consensual sex or her brutal rape
(there is of course no way to know)." For this girl, the expression of
desire attracted not only violence in the form of rape, but additional
brutality in the form of patriarchal control of her right to terminate the
pregnancy that results. The lesson that this teaches is that desire in
women is dangerous, that no expression of women's desire that fails to
neglecting the work God has appointed you to perform?" AuGusTUs GARDNER,
Physical Decline ofAmerican Women, in CoNJuA. SINS AGAINST THE LAWS oF LIaF
AND HE.rAH 199, 225 (1870). A published report of the Ohio Senate special
committee introducing anti-abortion legislation deplored women who sought
abortions as yielding to the "demands of society and fashionable life." Reva Siegel,
Reasoning fiom the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Ques-
tions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L Rnv. 261, 316 (1992)(quoting 1867 OHIO
SENATE J. App. 235). This kind of rhetoric is mirrored in the contemporary context.
For example, Justice White in Doe v. Bolton described Roe v. Wade as protecting
women's right to terminate a pregnancy for reasons of "convenience, whim, or
caprice" or for "no reason at all." 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
See also iUnda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS LJ. (forth-
coming 1996) (manuscript on file with author). This denigration of abortion-
seeking women may well be a symptom of ambivalence towards the figure of the
mother. See Julia E. Hanigsberg, Power and Procreation. State Interference in Preg-
nancy, 23 OtrAWA L Rnv. 35, 44-45 (1991) (describing idealization and
demonization of mothers).
77. Joan Nestle, My Mother Liked to Fuck, in PowERs oF DEsIRE, supra note 44, at
469.
78. Nestle, supra note 77, at 469.
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simultaneously control men's sexuality-a control that power differen-
tials between men and women make impossible-is safe. Would a social
recognition of women's andgirls' desires make sex safer for them?
Because of the lack of a voice of women's desire in the abortion
debate, abstinence is hailed as the only foolproof solution (proposed by
the "pro-life" movement) to the abortion "problem."7 9 Abstinence is,
seemingly, defined as women, rather than men, abstaining from sexual
intercourse.8 0 For a heterosexual woman to exert control over her repro-
ductive life, her "option" is to erase herself as a person with desire, to
neuter herself. Thus, the only road to autonomy, to the freedom to
choose not to carry a child, is to be heterosexually sexless and to live
without the companionship of a partner.8" The underlying assumption
is that women do not really desire at all, that sex is not something
women need. Abstinence is something we can simply choose, like
heeding the latest recommendation to keep our fat intake under thirty
percent of our daily calorie consumption-one choice among many. Of
course, this anti-abortion rhetoric fails to point out that women's desire,
or lack of it, is not respected by law or by men. The abortion decision
highlights the vicious circle that is created by the lack of a voice of
women's desire. A woman cannot fully express sexual desire if she has
no access to abortion, because the expression of desire may have the
immediate effect of destroying her autonomy and subjugating her body
to the needs of an unwanted child.
To take another example, when courts treat lesbians unequally in
family law, discriminating against them in issues of custody and visita-
tion,8 2 adoption, or access to reproductive technologies, 3 it may be that
79. Forty-seven percent of unintended pregnancies occur in women who are using con-
traception at the time of the pregnancy. For example, six percent of oral contra-
ceptive users become pregnant within the first year of use. Rachel Benson Gold &
Cory L. Richards, Securing American Women's Reproductive Health, in THE AmEvi-
cAN WoMAN i994-95 203, 205 (Cynthia Costello & Anne J. Stone eds., 1994).
80. Ironically, in this context women's agency and ability to control sexuality is assumed.
81. Ellen Willis, Abortion: Is a Woman a Person?, in PowEas oF DEsiR, supra note 44,
at 473-74. Of course, the pro-life movement does not suggest lesbian sexuality as
an acceptable pro-life alternative expression of desire. This suggests a further con-
nection between desire and abortion that needs to be elaborated.
82. See, e.g., Donald H. Stone, The Moral Dilemma Child Custody When One Parent Is
Homosexual or Lesbian-An Empirical Study, 23 SuFFoLK U. L Ray. 711 (1989);
S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. App. 1987); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240
(Mo. App. 1982); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985).
83. See Katherine Arnup, Finding Fathers: Artificial Insemination, Lesbians, and the Law,
7 CAN. J. WoMN &- L 97 (1994).
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they are being discriminated against not only because of their sexual
orientation but also because they are asking to be recognized as mothers
while the court has to explicitly confront the fact (or fantasy) of their
sexuality. Would a voice of women's desires force courts to treat lesbi-
ans more equally to heterosexual women since the "fact" of heterosexual
women's desires would no longer be rendered invisible? If heterosexual
mothers were not seen as devoid of sexuality and were acknowledged to
have sex lives, and if this fact were no longer determinative in custody
proceedings, the sexuality of lesbian mothers might be less of a
stark-and prejudicial-contrast. Rather than lesbian mothers being
reduced to nothing but sexuality, the sexuality of all mothers would be
a less menacing factor in custody determinations. Indeed, both lesbians
and straight women might be treated more equally to men, whose
sexuality is seldom held to the same standard of "virtue" as is
women's.
84
Finally, finding a women's voice of desire could change how we
perceive the sexuality of teenage girls.85 The current perception of
female teenage sexuality is illustrated by the television show Jacqui's
Dilemma.86 The "dilemma" of the title is an unwanted pregnancy. The
show alternates between a monologue delivered by an actor portraying
the white, sixteen-year-old Jacqui and interviews with "real" teenagers
(male and female, African-American and white) as well as experts in the
field of teenage pregnancyY Not once in the entire hour-long show was
the desire of the young women who got pregnant ever mentioned.
84. See, e.g., Parrillo v. Parrillo, 554 A.2d 1043 (R.I. 1989); Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400
N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1979). Cf In re Marriage of Thompson, 449 N.E.2d 88 (Ill.
1983). See also CASES AND MATEIALS ON FEMINISr JURISPRUDENCE: TAXING
WOMEN SERIOUSLY 628-31 (Mary Becker et al. eds., 1994); Carol Sanger, Seasoned
to the Use, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1338, 1341-42 (1989)(examining "the perceived
incompatibility of sexuality and motherhood"). However, homosexual men are likely
to find their sexual lives subject to court constraint. See, e.g., Kendall Thomas,
Beyond the Prvay Princzple, 92 COLUM. L Rnv. 1431, 1436-43 (1992). This is the
case, for example, in the visitation or custody setting. E.g., In re J.S. & C., 324
A.2d 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (prohibiting the presence of father's gay
partner during children's visits). Perhaps this suggests that courts define both
homosexual sexuality and women's sexuality as equally deviant.
85. For a particularly helpful discussion of this topic see Higgins & Tolman, supra note
63.
86. Jacqui's Dilemma (ABC television broadcast, June 3, 1994).
87. Those who appeared on the program included June Johnson of Planned Parent-
hood, doctors who perform abortions, then-Surgeon General Joycelyn Elders,
representatives of "pro-life" groups, social workers, parents, teachers, and representa-
tives of adoption services.
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Jacqui herself described her sexual experience in terms of a combination
of fear, pressure from her boyfriend, and surprise when "it just hap-
pened." Other young women who were interviewed talked about want-
ing to hold on to their boyfriends through sex and believing that if they
slept with them, the boys they would return their love.8 Not one girl
mentioned that she wanted sex, pure and simple. In contrast, the boys'
interviews often brought up active desire: wanting sex, "wanting a home
run once you've gotten to third," wanting to have fun. Indeed, the fun
in sex was uniquely portrayed as the domain of the boys. This is not to
say that the boys' sexuality is portrayed in a positive light. Although
they do express agency, the language of sexuality for them is largely
expressed in terms of conquest and domination. 9 Nor do I take this to
mean that girls do not experience their own desire, but rather, that for
the purposes of portrayal of adolescent sexuality in the mainstream
media, the desire of girls was invisible.9" Just as Flora, in The Piano, was
88. In her discussion of teenage pregnancies among African-American women, Regina
Austin observes:
For the females, sex is a means of capturing the affection, exclusive
attention, and potential lasting economic assistance of a male partner.
Enmeshed in dreamy notions of settling down with a good man, raising a
fianily, and having a fine home, the females endeavor to make a soap
opera of real life.
Austin, supra note 71, at 560 (citations omitted).
89. Austin discusses the African-American fathers of the children of African-American
teen mothers:
For the males, sexual conquests substitute for successful economic engage-
ment outside of the confines of the community. "Casual sex with as many
women as possible, impregnating one or more, and getting them to 'have
your baby' brings a boy the ultimate in esteem from his peers and makes
him a 'man.'" Status is accorded to those who make a fool out of the
ladies and creatively avoid efforts to make them "play house."
Austin, supra note 71, at 560-61 (citations omitted).
90. A "positive discourse of desire," in the way this term is used by Sara Ruddick, is ab-
sent. The "negative discourse" is omnipresent. Ruddick describes the latter as
"minatory or prohibitive, concepts that say 'watch out,' 'stop,' 'don't.' The defining
aim of this negative discourse is to strengthen and legitimate women's 'power to
refuse.'" Sara Ruddick, Procreative Choice fir Adolescent Women, in THu PoLnTcs OF
PREGWANCY 126, 133-34 (Annette Lawson & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 1993). In
contrast,
[a] positive discourse, of desire, recognizes the pleasures of sexuality and
the rewards of sexual intimacy. It speaks of birthgivers' sense of achieve-
ment and the delight many birthgivers take in carrying, giving birth to,
and marveling at an emerging, then newborn infant. It talks of good
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sanctioned for her expression of autoeroticism in the company of the
Maori,91 prime time family mores seem to suggest that erotic desire in
teenaged girls is unseemly. If as a society we were able to acknowledge
that active desire on the part of teenage girls is positive, we might see
issues of teenage reproduction differently. For example, it might not
make sense to restrict access to contraception. However, given the
contemporary political culture of the United States, "making sense"
does not seem to be a requirement for public policy. Given that access
to reproductive services is being eroded for adult women,92 the possi-
bility of increasing access for teenagers seems utopian in the extreme.
Jacqui's Dilemma was marketed as informational for teenagers, but
the messages that it sent are frightening, including the suggestion that
sexuality for girls is all about fear, error, and betrayal (for example,
thinking a boy will love you if you sleep with him and then finding out
that he doesn't). No other alternative is suggested, and it goes without
saying that on network television the expression of sexuality outside of
heterosexual sex is not even considered. Perhaps a voice of women's
desire would shift the terms of the debate on teenage sexuality, de-
manding that we reconsider issues such as availability of contraception,
access to abortion, and parental consent requirements.
93
CONCLUSION
Although the examples I offer are preliminary, I hope that they
begin to suggest how legitimated voices of desire for women might help
to change the way issues of reproductive decision making are framed. If
women can speak their desires, can this change the way that we see
moments in relationships with children and the relationships between
adults that children foster and describes with respectfid appreciation the
demanding work of mothering. The central concepts of this positive dis-
course are enabling, concepts that say "act," "enjoy," "create," and "nur-
ture." Its defining aim is to legitimate and enrich women's capacity to
desire and enjoy.
Ruddick, supra, at 133-34.
91. See supra text accompanying note 27.
92. See, e.g., Jerry Gray, Senate Limits Federal Funds for Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
1995, at Al (reporting Senate vote to bar use of federal funds to pay for abortions
for federal workers).
93. Interestingly, the show ends with Jacqui telling us that she has made a decision and
that the hard part now will be living with it, but we are never told whether she has
chosen marriage, abortion, adoption, or single motherhood.
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pregnancy? Will acknowledging women's desires allow us to focus
attention on women rather than their fetuses? Is desire a point of access
to women's ability to control their reproductive lives in the face of
overwhelming pressure to make themselves available to heterosexual
vaginal penetration? If the debate over abortion and other procreative
issues is at least in part about differing world views on the social conse-
quences of women's sexuality, as many have argued,9 then a sophisti-
cated analysis of that sexuality would seem to be a prerequisite to a
fuller articulation of the meaning of procreative freedom to women.
The Piano is a fascinating film because it makes explicit the con-
nection between language and desire. Through the use of the metaphors
of life outside of civilization and life outside of speech, it focuses atten-
tion on the complexities of women's desires and the way in which such
complexities are not fully articulated in the language of desire as con-
structed under patriarchy. Ada's story is challenging and disturbing
because it makes explicit the connections between law, commerce, and
desire that can be interpreted as the subtexts of our legal system more
generally. In The Piano, Ada is able to express her desire by exiting
from the legal structures that constrain it: she bears a child out of
wedlock with little explanation and no justification, she refuses to make
herself sexually available to her husband on his terms, and she explores
her sexuality in a relationship with a man who himself has tried to find
a world outside of European culture by identifying with the Maori
culture. By refusing to speak, Ada metaphorically refuses to be
complicit in a language of subordination. Her punishment for these
transgressions is violent and extreme. Ultimately, the movie does not
provide easy answers about whether she has been true to herself as she
leaves the world of her husband Stewart for a new life with Baines.
Unlike The Piano's Ada, women have no "outside" of civilization
where they can go, mute, to reclaim their sexuality. As I have suggested,
even for Ada, this "outside" is problematic and ultimately not as liberat-
ing as it might have first appeared. Ultimately, though, the notion of
women actually speaking their desires is revolutionary, an idea that
94. See, e.g., Rhonda Copelon, From Privacy to Autonomy: The Conditionsfr Sexual and
Reproductive Freedom, in FROM ABORTION TO REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM: TRANS-
FORMING A MoVEMENT (Marlene Gerber Fried ed., 1990); Faye Ginsburg, The Body
Politic: The Defense of Seual Restriction by Anti-Abortion Activists, in PI AURE AND
DANGER, supra note 67, at 173, 174; Brett Harvey, No More Nice Girls, in PLE-
SURE AND DANGER, supra note 67, at 204, 205 (emphasizing "women's right to
enjoy sex without fear of pregnancy").
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should challenge complacency in those comfortable with the status quo
and inspire hope in those who seek change. It may be the way to
restructure women's reproductive lives, and it certainly is a necessary
place to look for inspiration. t
